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Man Ho Au∗ , Guomin Yang, Willy Susilo and Yunmei Zhang
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research(CCISR), School of Computer Science and Software
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SUMMARY
Designated verifier signatures (DVS) allow a signer to create a signature whose validity can only be verified
by a specific entity chosen by the signer. In addition, the chosen entity, known as the designated verifier,
cannot convince any body that the signature is created by the signer. Multi-designated verifiers signatures
(MDVS) are a natural extension of DVS in which the signer can choose multiple designated verifiers. DVS
and MDVS are useful primitives in electronic voting and contract signing. In this paper, we investigate
various aspects of MDVS and make two contributions. Firstly, we revisit the notion of unforgeability under
rogue key attack on MDVS. In this attack scenario, a malicious designated verifier tries to forge a signature
that passes through the verification of another honest designated verifier. A common counter-measure
involves making the knowledge of secret key assumption (KOSK) in which an adversary is required to
produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key. We strengthened the existing security model to capture this
attack and propose a new construction that does not rely on the KOSK assumption. Secondly, we propose a
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
generic construction of strong MDVS. Copyright ⃝
Received . . .
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1. INTRODUCTION
Designated verifier signatures/proofs (DVS/DVP) were introduced by Jakobsson, Sako and
Impagliazzo [1], and independently by Chaum [2] in 1996. A DVS scheme allows a signer Alice
to convince a designated verifier Bob that Alice has endorsed the message while Bob cannot
transfer this conviction to anyone else. The underlying principle of DVS is that a signature is a
non-interactive proof that asserts the validity of the statement “Alice has endorsed a message” or
“the signer has Bob’s secret key”. While Bob is convinced that Alice has endorsed the message, he
cannot convince Carol as the proof could have been produced by Bob himself. In the same paper,
Jakobsson et al. introduce the concept of strong DVS (SDVS) in which the private key of Bob is
required to verify the signature. Recall that DVS itself discloses the information that the signature
is produced by Alice or Bob. If an external party, Carol, is confident that Bob has not created the
signature, she knows Alice has endorsed the message. An example is that the signature is captured
by Carol before it reaches Bob. This requirement is formalized as privacy of signer’s identity in [3].
It is required that without Bob’s private key, Carol cannot tell if a signature is created by Alice or
another signer.
In [1], the concept of multiple verifiers has been discussed and in the rump session of
Crypto’03, Desmedt [4] proposed the notion of multi-designated verifiers signatures (MDVS)
∗ Correspondence
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as a generalization of DVS. It was later formalized in [5]. Since then, a number of MDVS
constructions [1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] with different features in different settings
have been proposed. Interested readers may refer to [15] for a survey.
The problem of rogue key attack in DVS was first discussed in [1]. In the discussion, the goal of
a malicious verifier Bob is to convince an external party Carol that the signer Alice has endorsed
the message. For example, Bob can create his public key as the output of a hash function using a
random number as input. Later, when Bob reveals the value of the random number, everyone will
be convinced that the signatures must have been created by Alice. One of the counter-measures
suggested is to require Bob to prove the knowledge of his secret key. Another type of rogue key
attack specifically targeting MDVS was discussed in [16]. In this attack, a malicious verifier Carol
creates her public key as a function of other honest verifiers’ public keys so that she could create a
signature that passes the verification of other honest verifiers. Again, the suggested counter-measure
is to require the verifier to prove the knowledge of her secret key. Note that no formal model has
been proposed to capture the attack. We remark that the two types of rogue key attacks are different
in nature. The former is against non-transferability while the latter is against unforgeability. In this
paper, our focus is on the latter.
As discussed, a counter-measure against rogue key attack in MDVS is to require the adversary
to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key. In practice, this implies all users would have to
produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key to the certification authority (CA) before the CA
certifies the corresponding public key. This solution requires a change in the current PKI and is
regarded as costly [17]. Thus, it is desirable to design MDVS secure against rogue key attack in the
plain model. In respond to this, we provide a partial solution by proposing the first MDVS scheme
that is formally proven unforgeable under rogue key attack.
It is known that if we encrypt the DVS under the designated verifier’s public key, the resulting
scheme would be a strong DVS. Nonetheless, a subtle issue discussed in [5] prevent such generic
transformation to be applicable to the case of MDVS. Specifically, the challenge is to ensure
correctness of the resulting scheme since it is entirely possible for a signer to encrypt different values
under different designated verifier’s public key so that a signature could be regarded as valid by some
of the designated verifiers only. We tackle this issue with an hybrid encryption using a simple oneway secure encryption and a symmetric encryption and show that the unforgeability under rogue key
attack is preserved in our generic transformation. Specifically, we make the following contributions.
1.1. Contribution.
1. We present a formal definition for MDVS that captures existential forgery under rogue key
attack.
2. We propose a construction that is provably secure against rogue key attack in the random
oracle model.
3. We present two generic constructions of strong MDVS (with concrete instantiations) secure
against rogue key attack in the random oracle model.
1.1.1. Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the
syntax of a MDVS scheme and its security definitions. We discuss the rogue key attack on MDVS,
its formal definition and our proposed solution in Section 3. In Section 4 and 5, we present generic
constructions of strong MDVS together with concrete instantiations of the building blocks. We
conclude our paper in Section 6.

2. PRELIMINARY
If n is a positive integer, we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. We review the following well-known
computational assumptions.
Definition 1 (DL Assumption)
Let G = ⟨g⟩ be a cyclic group of prime order p. The discrete logarithm assumption states that
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Copyright ⃝
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given a tuple (g, Z) ∈ (G, G), it is computationally infeasible to compute the value z ∈ Zp such
that Z = g z .
Definition 2 (CDH Assumption)
Let G = ⟨g⟩ be a cyclic group of prime order p. The computational Diffie-Hellman assumption states
that given a tuple (g, g a , g b ) ∈ (G, G, G), it is computationally infeasible to compute the value g ab .
We also review a variant of the CDH assumption, the divisible computation Diie-Hellman
assumption (DCDH). It has been shown in [18] that the DCDH assumption and the CDH assumption
are equivalent.
Definition 3 (DCDH Assumption)
Let G = ⟨g⟩ be a cyclic group of prime order p. The divisible computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption states that given a tuple (g, g a , g b ) ∈ (G, G, G), it is computationally infeasible to
compute the value g a/b .
2.1. Syntax
We adapt the definitions and security models of MDVS from various literatures [5, 9]. A
MDVS scheme consists of four algorithms, namely, Setup, Gen, Sign, Verify, whose functions are
enumerated below.
param ← Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs the public parameter
param for the system. Note that this algorithm is optional if all users could generate their
key pairs without any coordination. Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, all existing
schemes requires the users to create their keys based on some commonly known system
parameters. We assume param is an implicit input to all algorithms listed below.
(pk, sk) ← Gen(): This algorithm outputs a key pair (pk, sk) for a user (who can take the role of a
signer or a designated verifier). If (pk, sk) is an output of the algorithm Gen(), we say pk is
the corresponding public key of sk (and vice versa).
(σ, V) ← Sign(skS , V, m) : On input a message m, a secret key of a signer skS (whose public key
is pkS ) and a set of designated verifiers’ public keys V , this algorithm outputs a signature σ ,
which is a designated verifier signature of m with respect to the public key pkS .

valid/invalid ← Verify(pkS , σ, V, m, skV ) : On input a public key pkS , a message m, a
signature σ with a set of designated verifiers’ public keys V and a private key skV such
that the corresponding public key pkV ∈ V , this algorithm verifies the signature and outputs
valid/invalid.
A MDVS scheme must possess Correctness, Unforgeability and Source-Hiding, to be reviewed
below.
Correctness. For any security parameter λ and param ← Setup(1λ ), (pkS , skS ) ← Gen() and
V = {pkV1 , . . ., pkVn } such that (pkVi , skVi ) ← Gen() for i ∈ [n] . For any message m, if (σ, V) ←
Sign(skS , V, m), then valid ← Verify(pkS , σ , V , m, skVi ) for all i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, for any
values σ , V , m, pkS , if there exists a private key skV such that its corresponding public key
pkV ∈ V and that valid ← Verify(pkS , σ , V , m, skV ), then for any private key skV ′ , it holds
that valid ← Verify(pkS , σ , V , m, skV ′ ) if the corresponding public key pkV ′ ∈ V .
Unforgeability. The following game between a challenger C and an adversary A formally captures
the requirement of Unforgeability.
Setup C invokes Setup(1λ ) and subsequently Gen() to obtain (param, (pkS , skS ),
{(pkVi , skVi )}i∈[n] ). Denote the set {pkVi }i∈[n] by V . (param, pkS , V) is given to A.
Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Copyright ⃝
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• Corruption Query. A submits a public key pkV ∈ V and receives skV .
• Signature Query. A submits a message m and receives (σ , V) ← Sign(skS , V , m).

Output A submits (σ ∗ , m∗ ) and wins if and only if
1. There exists a public key pkV ∗ ∈ V such that valid ← Verify(pkS , σ ∗ , V , m∗ , skV ∗ ).
2. A has not submitted a Signature Query with input m∗ .
3. There exists a public key pkV ∈ V such that A has not submitted a Corruption Query as
input.
Definition 4 (Unforgeability)
A MDVS scheme is unforgeable if no PPT adversary wins the above game with non-negligible
probability.
As stated in [5], the adversary is not given an oracle for signature verification as he can verify any
signatures by corrupting some of the verifiers.
Source hiding. It means that given a message m and a signature (σ, V), it is infeasible to determine
who from the original signer or the designated verifiers all together created the signature, even if
all the secret keys are known. The formal definition is adapted from Definition 3 of [19] for normal
DVS into that for MDVS.
Definition 5 (Source Hiding)
A MDVS scheme is source hiding if there exists a PPT simulation algorithm Sim that on
input a public key pkS , a set of key pairs (pkVi , skVi )i∈[n] and a message m, outputs a tuple
(σ, V) (such that V = {pkVi }i∈[n] ) that is indistinguishale to (σ, V) ← Sign(skS , V, m) (where skS
is the corresponding private key of pkS ). In other words, for all PPT algorithmn D, for any
security parameter λ, param ← Setup(1λ ), (pkS , skS ) ← Gen(), {(pkVi , skVi ) ← Gen()}i∈[n] and
any message m, it holds that:


(σ0 , V) ← Sign(skS , V, m)

 (σ1 , V) ← Sim(pkS , {pkVi , skVi }i∈[n] , m)
: b = b′  − 1/2 = negl(λ)
Pr 
b ∈R {0, 1}
b′ ← D(σb , pkS , skS , {pkVi , skVi }i∈[n] , m)
where negl(λ) represents a negligible function in λ. A function negl(λ) is said to be negligible in
λ if for all polynomial q(·), there exists a value k0 such that for every λ > k0 , negl(λ) < 1/q(λ).
2.2. Strong Multi-Designated Verifiers Signatures
Strong Multi-Designated Verifiers Signatures. It is desirable in many scenarios that, besides
the signer and the verifier, a third party cannot tell if a signature for the verifier is created by that
particular signer or by someone else. This concept appeared in [1] and is formally defined as privacy
of signer’s identity (PSI) in [20]. This applies to the case of multiple designated verifiers and the
property PSI for MDVS is defined in [5].
Privacy of signer’s identity. The following game between a challenger C and an adversary A
formally captures the requirement of PSI.
Setup C invokes Setup(1λ ) and subsequently Gen() to obtain (param, (pkS0 , skS0 ), (pkS1 , skS1 ),
{(pkVi , skVi )}i∈[n] ). Denote the set {pkVi }i∈[n] by V . (param, pkS0 , pkS1 , V) is given to A.
Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
• Verification Query. A submits (m, σ, V, pkSc : c ∈ {0, 1}, V ∈ V) and receives
valid/invalid ← Verify(pkSc , σ, V ∪ pkV , m, skV ).
• Signature Query. A submits a message m, a bit b and receives (σ , V) ← Sign(skSb , V ,
m).
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Challenge At some point A submits a message m∗ . C flips a fair coin b and returns (σ ∗ , V) ←
Sign(skSb , V , m).
Query A continues to make verification and signature queries.
Output A submits a bit b′ and wins if and only if b′ = b.
A’s advantage in the game PSI is defined as the probability that A wins the game minus 1/2.

Definition 6 (Privacy of signer’s identity)
A MDVS scheme is said to possess privacy of signer’s identity if no PPT adversary has nonnegligible advantage in game PSI.
A strong MDVS scheme is a MDVS scheme that possesses privacy of signer’s identity.

3. ROUGE KEY ATTACK IN MDVS AND ITS SOLUTION
We first review the generic construction of MDVS from discrete logarithm-based ring signatures [5].
In the next subsection, we describe how a malicious designated verifier could launch a rogue key
attack to make an honest verifier into accepting a forged signature. We stress that this attack is
outside the original security model and does not imply the scheme is insecure. Rather, we would
like to show that a signature that passes the verification of a particular honest designated verifier
could have been created by a real signer or some other malicious verifiers. Finally, we propose a fix.
3.1. Generic Construction of MDVS [5]
The generic construction utilizes ring signatures as building blocks and requires that all the keys are
discrete logarithm-based. Readers are referred to [21] for the formal definition of a ring signature
scheme. Roughly speaking, a ring signature is a signature created from one of the possible signers in
a set of signers (often called a ring of signers). The ring of signers are created in an ad-hoc manner
by the actual signer. The formation is spontaneous in that the members can be completely unaware
of being conscripted into the ring. In the generic construction of MDVS, ring signatures supporting
a ring size of 2 is required.
• Setup. This is equivalent to the parameter generation of the ring signature scheme (if any).
• Gen. This is equivalent to the key generation of the ring signature scheme. The generic
construction requires the key of the ring signature to be of the form (g x , x) where g is included
in the parameter, x is the signing key and g x is the corresponding public key.
• Sign. Let the signer’s key pair be (g xS , xS ) and the set of
∏designated verifiers’ key pairs be
{(g xVi , xVi )} for i = 1 to n. The signer computes g XV = i∈[n] g xVi . Next, the signer creates
a ring signature on message m on the ring {g xS , g xV } using the secret key xS . Denote the
output as σ . This value, together with the set {g xVi }i∈[n] , is outputted as the multi-designated
verifier signature.
• ∏
Verify. To verify the signature (σ, {g xVi }i∈[n] ) on message m, a verifier computes g XV =
xVi
. Then it employs the verification algorithm of the ring signature scheme on the
i∈[n] g
XS
ring {g , g XV }.

The unforgeability property comes from the fact that to create a ring signature on the ring
{g xS , g xV }, one needs to know xS or xV . Since the adversary does not know xS or xV † , forging a
signature implies breaking the unforgeability of the underlying ring signature scheme. On the other
hand, the source hiding property comes from the fact∑
that if all secret keys of the verifiers are known,
one can construct a PPT Sim which computes xV = i∈[n] xVi and uses it to create a ring signature
on behalf of the ring {g xS , g xV }. Due to the anonymity of ring signature, no PPT algorithm can
distinguish a signature created by the real signer using xS or by Sim using xV .
† Since

the adversary cannot corrupt all the verifiers, it does not know the value xV , which is equal to

c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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3.2. Rouge Key Attack and Its Defence
Existential Forgery under Rouge Key Attack. Rouge key attack against a concrete scheme in [5]
has been discussed in [16]. Here we extend the attack to the generic construction of [5]. Suppose
an adversary’s goal is to convince an honest designated verifier into accepting a forged signature.
Let g xS , g xV ′ be the public keys of the targeted signer and designated verifier respectively. To
cheat the verifier, the adversary randomly generates a value xA and crafts a mal-formed public
key K = g xA /g xV ′ . Next, the adversary computes g xV = Kg xV ′ = g xA . Since the adversary is in
possession of xA , he can create a ring signature on the ring {g xS , g xV }. He outputs the signature,
together with the set of designated verifiers as {g xV ′ , K}. Consequently, the designated verifier
would accept a forged signature created by the adversary instead of the signer. We denote attack of
this kind as forgery against rogue key attack (RKA).
A Proposed Fix. The problem comes from the extra power given to the adversary to create
malformed public key. The fix suggest in [16] is to require the certification authority to check the
validity of the public key before issuing a digital certificate. In terms of modelling, this implies the
stronger certified key model in which the users are required to conduct a proof-of-knowledge of his
secret key to the CA. As argue in [17], this requires modification of the client and CA functioning
software. We propose another way that could withstand this attack in the plain model based on a
technique used in multisignautres
[17] and batch verification of digital signatures [22]. In a nutshell,
∏
g xV is defined to be i∈[n] (g xVi )hi , where hi = H(g xS , g xV1 , . . . , g xVn , m, i) for a hash function
H which shall be modelled as a random oracle. Observe that with this modification, the value xV
can still be computed if all the values xVi are known. On the other hand, if one of the secret keys,
say xVi , is unknown, the value xV cannot be computed since the probability of “canceling” g xVi in
the computation of g xV is negligible assuming the values hi are randomly distributed and are only
known after the value of the public keys are chosen.
3.3. Formal Security Definition for Unforgeability Under Rogue Key Attack
To formally assert the security of our proposed solution, we define a security model which intends
to capture attack of this kind.‡ We believe a verification query with the target verifier may be of use
to the adversary since the adversary might try to submit mal-formed signatures to learn information
about the target verifier’s verification procedure.
Unforgeability Against Rogue Key Attack. The following game between a challenger C and an
adversary A formally captures the requirement of UF-RKA
Setup C invokes Setup(1λ ) and subsequently Gen() to obtain (param, (pkS , skS ), (pkV , skV ).
(param, pkS , pkV ) is given to A.
Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
• Verification Query. A submits a set of public keys V , a signature (σ, V ∪ pkV ), a message
m and receives valid/invalid ← Verify(pkS , σ, V ∪ pkV , m, skV ).
• Signature Query. A submits a message m, a set of public keys V and receives (σ, V) ←
(skS , V, m). Note that A can submit an arbitrary set of verifiers of his choice (even a set
without pkV ).

Output A submits (σ ∗ , m∗ ) and a set of public keys V ∗ and wins if and only if
1. valid ← Verify(pkS , σ ∗ , V ∗ ∪ pkV , m∗ , skV ).
2. A has not submitted a Signature Query with input (m∗ , V ∗ ∪ pkV ).
‡ While

rogue key attack on MDVS is discussed in [16], no formal security model has been proposed to capture such an

attack.
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Definition 7 (UF-RKA)
A MDVS scheme is unforgeable under rogue key attack if no PPT adversary wins the above game
with non-negligible probability.
We believe UF-RKA for MDVS is a stronger notion compared with the notion Unforgeability.
3.4. A Concrete Construction
We present a concrete MDVS scheme from a commonly used two-party ring signature following
the generic construction together with our proposed fix.
• Setup. Let G = ⟨g⟩ be a cyclic group of prime order p. Output param as (G, p, g).
• Gen. Choose a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp which will be modelled as a random oracle§ .
Randomly generate x ∈R Zp , compute g x . Output pk as (g x , H) and sk as x.
• Sign. On input the signer’s key pair (pkS , skS ), a set of designated verifier’s public keys
V = {pkV1 , . . . , pkVn } and a message m, parse pkS as (YS , HS ), skS as xS , pkVi as (YVi , HVi ).
∏
Compute Y = i∈[n] YVhii where hi = HVi (pkS , pkV1 , . . ., pkVn , m).

1. Randomly generate r, c2 , z2 ∈ Zp , compute T1 = g r , T2 = Y c2 g z2 .
2. Compute c = HS (T1 , T2 , pkS , pkV1 , h1 , . . ., pkVn , hn , Y , m) and c1 = c − c2 .
3. Compute z1 = r − c1 xS .
Output the signature as (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 , V). Note that (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 ) is a ring signature on
message m with respective to ring {YS , Y }.
• We remark that the above steps constitute a standard signature proof-of-knowledge of 1-outof-2 discrete logarithms (which can be viewed as a two-party ring signature). This can be
presented as follows using the Camenisch and Stadler notation [23].
SPK {(α) : YS = g α ∨ Y = g α } (m)
• Verify. To verify the signature (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 , {pkVi }i∈[n] ) on message m, a verifier parses pkVi
∏
HV (pk ,pk ,...,pkVn ,m)
as (YVi , HVi ) and computes Y = i∈[n] YVi i S V1
. Output valid if and only
if
)
(
c1 + c2 = HS YSc1 g z1 , Y c2 g z2 , pkS , pkV1 , h1 , . . . , pkVn , hn , Y, m

and invalid otherwise.
Regarding the security of our concrete construction, we have the following theorem, whose proof
can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 1
Our concrete construction is secure under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle
model. Specifically, it satisfies
• definition 4 under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model;
• definition 5 unconditionally;
• definition 7 under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model.

4. GENERIC STRONG MDVS
Strong DVS can be constructed from DVS via encrypting the signature under the designated
verifier’s public key. However, the intuitive solution of encrypting the signature under each
designated verifier’s public key in the case of multiple designated verifiers is not satisfactory. As
§ We abuse the notation and assume a full domain hash. In the following when we write c = H(X, Y ) where X and Y
may be elements from different domains, we assume a suitable encoding scheme is employed to convert X, Y into a
bit-string.

c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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discussed in [5], this intuitive solution creates a subtle issue in correctness. Specifically, if some of
the encryptions are not executed properly, the signer could create an “invalid” signature that would
be regarded as valid by some verifiers.
4.1. Overview of Our Generic Construction
To tackle this challenge, we observe that it is straightforward to use a verifiable encryption [24]
which allows the signer to create a proof that all ciphertext decrypts to the same value. By
verifying the proof, all verifiers are assured that all the verifiers obtains the same value for signature
verification. This solution is, however, expensive. Looking at an abstract level, the goal of this
encryption is to ensure all verifiers obtains the same value via decryption. This can be achieved,
perhaps somewhat interestingly, using a very weak one-way encryption with an explicit “IND-CPA”
attack. Denote such an encryption scheme as WE . That is, given a message k , anyone can check if
the ciphertext C decrypts to it. It is easy for a verifier to check locally if all the encryptions of the
designated verifier signature are properly done.
This creates another problem. Since WE is only one-way secure, the ciphertext might leak
information about the signature being encrypted and thus privacy of signer’s identity is not
guaranteed. Thus, we employ a hybrid approach. WE is used to encrypt a symmetric key k under all
the designated verifiers public keys into ciphertexts C1 , . . ., Cn . The ordinary MDVS is encrypted
with a symmetric key encryption SE with key k . As long as the key k cannot be recovered from the
ciphertext Ci ’s, no information about the MDVS can be learnt as long as the symmetric encryption
SE is secure. Looking ahead, we assume SE to be an idealized cipher for the ease of security
analysis. This means that our generic construction is secure in the ideal cipher model, which is
equivalent to the random oracle model due to the result of [25].
4.2. Building Block of Our Generic Construction
While conceptually simple, two properties regarding WE are needed. The first one is an efficient
and explicit “IND-CPA” attack. The second one is an efficient and explicit malleability attack which
allows anyone to transform a ciphertext C under public key Y into another ciphertext C ′ under
public key Y ′ so that they are encrypting the same message. The malleability attack on WE is
needed in the proof of security for multiple designated verifiers.
Below we define the requirement of the weakly secure encryption WE as follows.
• paramWE ← WE.Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs the
public parameter paramWE for the system. We assume paramWE is an implicit input to all
algorithms listed below.
• (WE.pk, WE.sk) ← WE.Gen(): This algorithm outputs a key pair (WE.pk, WE.sk).
• CWE ← WE.Enc(WE.pk, m) : On input a message m and a public key of the receiver WE.pk,
this algorithm outputs the ciphertext CWE .
• m ← WE.Dec(WE.sk, CWE ) : On input a secret key WE.sk, a ciphertext CWE , this algorithm
outputs the plaintext m.
• 0/1 ← WE.iAtk(WE.pk, CWE , m) : This is an attack on indistinguishability of ciphertext.
On input a public key WE.pk, a ciphertext CWE and a plaintext m, output 1 if and only if
m = WE.Dec(WE.sk, CWE ), where WE.sk is the corresponding private key of WE.pk and 0
otherwise. Note that WE.sk is not an input to this algorithm.
′
• (CWE
, WE.pk′ ) ← WE.mAtk(WE.pk, CWE ) : This is an attack on malleability of ciphertext.
′
On input a public key WE.pk, a ciphertext CWE , output CWE
, WE.pk′ such that the
′
′
distribution of CWE
is indistinguishable to that of WE.Enc(WE.pk , WE.Dec(WE.sk, CWE )).
Note that the algorithm does not output the corresponding secret key for WE.pk′ .

We require the one-way security of WE , which is formally defined as the following game between
a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup C invokes WE.Setup(1λ ) and subsequently WE.Gen() to obtain (paramWE , WE.pk, WE.sk).
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Challenge C picks a random message m, compute CWE ← WE.Enc(WE.pk, m). (paramWE ,
WE.pk, CWE ) is given to A.
Output A outputs m′ and wins if and only if m = m′ .
WE is one-way secure if no PPT adversary A wins the above game with non-negligible
probability.
We propose a construction of WE based on the Elgamal encryption in a cyclic group equipped
with a bilinear map.
• WE.Setup(1λ ): Generate a pair of groups G, GT of the same prime order p of λ-bit and a
bilinear map ê : G × G → GT . Let g be a generator of G. Set paramWE = (G, GT , p, g, ê).
• WE.Gen(): Randomly pick u ∈R Zp , compute U = g u . Set (WE.pk, WE.sk) = (U, u).
• WE.Enc(U, m) : On input a message m ∈ G, randomly generate r ∈R Zp , output CWE =
(C, D) as (mU r , g r ).
• WE.Dec(u, (C, D)) : Output C/Du .
• WE.iAtk(U, (C, D), m) : Output 1 if and only if
ê(C/m, g) = ê(D, U )

and 0 otherwise.
• WE.mAtk(U, (C, D)) : Randomly
e, f ∈)R Zp , compute U ′ = U g e . Compute C̃ = CDe ,
( pick
′
′f
′
f
′
C = C̃U , D = Dg . Output (C , D′ ), U ′ .
Note that if U = g u , C = mU r , D = g r , it is easy to see that C ′ = m(U g e )r+f , D′ = g r+f and
U = U g e . Thus, (C ′ , D′ ) is encrypting the message m under the public key U ′ with the correct
distribution.
Next, we show that our construction of WE is one-way secure under the computational DiffieHellman assumption.
′

Proof
Suppose there exists an adversary A that can win the game one-way security, we show how to
construction an algorithm S that solves the CDH problem in a group equipped with a bilinear map.
S is given (G, GT , ê, p, g, g a , g b ) and its goal is to output g ab .
S randomly picks a value C , gives paramWE = (G, GT , p, g, ê), U = g a , (C, D) = (C, g b ) to A.
Note that this implicit set the message being encrypted as m = C/g ab . A returns with a value m′ . S
computes C/m′ and outputs it as the solution to the CDH problem.
4.3. Our Generic Construction of Strong MDVS
We present our generic construction of Strong MDVS. Let MS = (MS.Setup, MS.Gen,
MS.Sign, MS.Verify) be a secure MDVS scheme. Let WE = (WE.Setup, WE.Gen, WE.Enc,
WE.Dec, WE.iAtk, WE.mAtk) be a one-way secure encryption. Let H be a hash function and SE
be a symmetric key encryption. We use SE.Enck and SE.Deck to denote encryption and decryption
operation of SE using key k . H , SE will be modelled as a random oracle and an ideal cipher
respectively. We show how to construct a strong MDVS scheme (Setup, Gen, Sign, Verify) as
follows.
• Setup. On input security parameter 1λ , invoke paramMS ← MS.Setup(1λ ) and paramWE ←
WE.Setup(1λ ), specify a weak encryption WE , a hash function H and a symmetric cipher
SE . Set param = (paramMS , paramWE , H , SE).
• Gen. Invoke (MS.pk, MS.sk) ← MS.Gen(), (WE.pk, WE.sk) ← WE.Gen(). Output pk =
(MS.pk, WE.pk) and sk = (MS.sk, WE.sk).
• Sign. Let pkS = (MS.pkS , WE.pkS ) and skS = (MS.skS , WE.skS ) be the key pair
of the signer. Let m be the message to be signed. Parse the set of verifiers to
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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be V = {pkV1 , . . . , pkVn } such that pkVi = (MS.pki , WE.pki ). Denote by VMS the set
{MS.pk1 , . . . , MS.pkn }.
The signer randomly picks k ∈R {0, 1}λ . For i = 1 to n, compute
Ci = WE.Enc(WE.pki , k)

Next, compute τ = H(pkS , pkV1 , C1 , . . . , pkVn , Cn , m). Invoke (σMS , VMS ) ←
Sign(MS.skS , VMS , m||τ ). Invoke E = SE.Enck (σMS ||τ ||pkS ).
Output the signature as (E, V, {Ci }i∈[n] ).
• Verify. To verify a signature (E , V , {Ci }i∈[n] ) on message m, a verifier V parses pkVi as
(MS.pki , WE.pki ) for all pkVi ∈ V and uses his secret key (MS.skV , WE.skV ) as follows.
– Locate the index i such that pkV = pkVi . Use his secret key to compute k = VE.Dec(Ci ,
WE.skV ).
– For all j ∈ [n] \ {i}, check if 1 = WE.iAtk(WE.pki , Ci , k). Output invalid if any of
the check outputs 0.
– Compute σMS , τ , pkS by SE.Deck (E).
– Output invalid if τ ̸= H(pkS , pkV1 , C1 , . . . , pkVn , Cn , m).
– Parse pkS as (MS.pkS , WE.pkS ).
– Invoke valid/ invalid ← MS.Verify( MS.pkS , σMS , {MS.pk1 , . . ., MS.pkn },
m||τ , MS.skV ).
Regarding the security of our generic construction, we have the following theorem, whose proof
can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 2
Our generic construction satisfies definition d if the underlying MDVS scheme MS satisfies
definitions d for d ∈ {4, 5, 7}. Furthermore, our generic construction satisfies definition 6 if WE
is one-way secure in the random oracle model.

5. OPTIMIZATION OF OUR GENERIC STRONG MDVS
Following the above idea, the goal of the weak one-way encryption WE is to encrypt a common
symmetric key for all designated verifiers. It can be replaced with a secure broadcast encryption.
The correctness of the broadcast encryption would ensure all designated verifiers obtain the same
common symmetric key. As in the case for WE , we shall show that this broadcast encryption
needs to be one-way secure with an explicit “IND-CPA attack”. While it is unlikely to have
broadcast encryption with constant-size ciphertext when the public key of the verifiers are generated
independently, it is still hopeful to have a construction that is more efficient than encrypting
individually for all designated verifiers. We formalise the requirement of this broadcast encryption,
denoted as BE , and give an efficient construction. We also show how this can be used to construct a
possibly more efficient Strong MDVS.
• paramBE ← BE.Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs the public
parameter paramBE for the system. We assume paramBE is an implicit input to all algorithms
listed below.
• (BE.pk, BE.sk) ← BE.Gen(): This algorithm outputs a key pair (BE.pk, BE.sk).
• (CBE , YBE ) ← BE.Enc(YBE , m) : On input a message m and a set of public keys of the
|Y |
receivers YBE = {BE.pki }i BE , this algorithm outputs the ciphertext CBE and the set YBE .
• m ← BE.Dec(BE.sk, CBE , YBE ) : On input a ciphertext CWE , a receiver set YBE , and a secret
key BE.sk such that the corresponding public key BE.pk ∈ YBE , this algorithm outputs the
plaintext m or ⊥ for invalid ciphertext.
• 0/1 ← BE.iAtk(YBE , CWE , m) : This is an attack on indistinguishability of ciphertext. On
input a set of public keys YBE , a ciphertext CBE and a plaintext m, output 1 if and only if
m = BE.Dec(BE.sk, CBE , YBE ), where BE.sk is a corresponding private key of BE.pk ∈ YBE
and 0 otherwise. Note that BE.sk is not an input to this algorithm.
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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One-wayness of BE which is formally defined as the following game between a challenger C and
an adversary A.
Setup C invokes BE.Setup(1λ ) and subsequently BE.Gen() to obtain paramBE and a set of key pairs
{(BE.pk, BE.sk1 ), . . . , (BE.pkn , BE.skn )}. Denote YBE as the set {BE.pki }ni=1 .
Challenge C picks a random message m, compute (CBE , YBE ) ← BE.Enc(YBE , m). (paramBE ,
YBE , CBE ) is given to A.
Output A outputs m′ and wins if and only if m = m′ .
BE is one-way secure if no PPT adversary A wins the above game with non-negligible probability.
We would like to stress correctness of BE is a subtle but important issue in our construction of
strong MDVS and we formally define the requirement in the following game between a challenger
C and an adversary A.

Challenge C invokes BE.Setup(1λ ) and subsequently BE.Gen() to obtain paramBE and a set of
key pairs {(BE.pk, BE.sk1 ), . . . , (BE.pkn , BE.skn )}. Denote YBE as the set {BE.pki }ni=1 .
(paramBE , YBE ) is given to A.
Output A outputs CBE . C computes m′i ← BE.Dec(BE.ski , CBE , YBE ) for i = 1 to n. A wins if and
only if there exists i, j ∈ [n] such that m′i ̸= m′j .
BE is said to be correct if no PPT adversary A wins the above game with non-negligible
probability.

5.1. A Construction of BE
We present a simple construction of BE , which is based on the optimization of our WE with multiple
receivers re-using the same randomness.
• BE.Setup(1λ ): Generate a pair of groups G, GT of the same prime order p of λ-bit and a
bilinear map ê : G × G → GT . Let g be a generator of G. Set paramBE = (G, GT , p, g, ê).
• BE.Gen(): Randomly pick u ∈R Zp , compute U = g u . Set (BE.pk, BE.sk) = (U, u).
• BE.Enc({U1 , . . . , Un }, m) : On input a message m ∈ G, randomly generate r ∈R Zp , output
CBE = (C, D1 , . . . , Dn ) as (mg r , U1r , . . . , Unr ).
u−1

• BE.Dec(ui , (C, D1 , . . . , Dn ), {U1 , . . . , Un }) : Compute m = C/Di i . Randomly generate
ℓ1 , . . . , ℓn ∈R Zp , output m if and only if
ê(C/m, U1ℓ1 · · · Unℓn ) = ê(g, D1ℓ1 · · · Dnℓn )

Output ⊥ otherwise.
• BE.iAtk({U1 , . . . , Un }, (C, D1 , . . . , Dn ), m) : Randomly generate ℓ1 , . . . , ℓn ∈R Zp , output 1
if and only if
ê(C/m, U1ℓ1 · · · Unℓn ) = ê(g, D1ℓ1 · · · Dnℓn )
and 0 otherwise.
Note that we use the technique in batch verification of pairing-based digital signatures again to
assure all verifiers would decrypt to the same value. This can be explained intuitively as follows. If
we denote r̂ as the discrete logarithm of C/m to base g , the equation
ê(C/m, U1ℓ1 · · · Unℓn ) = ê(g, D1ℓ1 · · · Dnℓn )

for randomly picked values ℓ1 , . . . ℓn implies (U1r̂ )ℓ1 · · · (Unr̂ )ℓn = D1ℓ1 · · · Dnℓn for all possible values
of ℓi with overwhelming probability. This implies Di = Uir̂ and thus all receivers decrypt to the same
value.
Next, we show that our construction of BE is one-way secure under the divisible computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption (which is equivalent to the CDH assumption).
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Proof
Suppose there exists an adversary A that can win the game one-way security, we show how to
construction an algorithm S that solves the DCDH problem in a group equipped with a bilinear
map. S is given (G, GT , ê, p, g, g a , g b ) and its goal is to output g a/b .
S chooses the size of the set n, randomly picks αi ∈R Zp and computes Ui = (g b )αi for i = 1
to n. Denote YBE as the set {Ui }ni=1 . S computes Di = (g a )αi and randomly chooses C ∈R G. S
gives paramBE = (G, GT , p, g, ê), CBE = (C, D1 , . . . , Dn ), YBE to A. Denote r as the value a/b, it
can be seen that the ciphertext given to the adversary is the encryption of the value m = C/g r (it
can be seen that Di = Uir for i = 1 to n.).
When the adversary returns m′ , S computes C/m′ as the solution for the DCDH problem. Note
that C/m′ will be g a/b .
5.2. Generic Construction of Strong MDVS from BE
Here, we use BE as the building block for the generic construction of strong MDVS. Note that this is
possibly better than the generic construction given in Section 4 as the previous generic construction
implies that the creation, verification as well as the size of the signature are both linear to the
number of designated verifiers. In practice, although our construction using BE is still linear size,
the computation has been reduced from n pairings to n exponentiations where n is the number of
designated verifiers. Furthermore, the signature size is reduced by half.
We present our second generic construction of Strong MDVS. Let MS = (MS.Setup, MS.Gen,
MS.Sign, MS.Verify) be a secure MDVS scheme. Let BE = (BE.Setup, BE.Gen, BE.Enc, BE.Dec,
BE.iAtk) be a one-way secure broadcast encryption BE . Let H be a hash function and SE be a
symmetric key encryption. We use SE.Enck and SE.Deck to denote encryption and decryption
operation of SE using key k . H , SE will be modelled as a random oracle and an ideal cipher
respectively. We show how to construct a strong MDVS scheme (Setup, Gen, Sign, Verify) as
follows.
• Setup. On input security parameter 1λ , invoke paramMS ← MS.Setup(1λ ) and paramBE ←
BE.Setup(1λ ), a hash function H and a symmetric cipher SE . Set param = (paramMS ,
paramBE , H , SE).
• Gen. Invoke (MS.pk, MS.sk) ← MS.Gen(), (BE.pk, BE.sk) ← BE.Gen(). Output pk =
(MS.pk, BE.pk) and sk = (MS.sk, BE.sk).
• Sign. Let pkS = (MS.pkS , BE.pkS ) and skS = (MS.skS , BE.skS ) be the key pair of
the signer. Let m be the message to be signed. Parse the set of verifiers to be
V = {pkV1 , . . . , pkVn } such that pkVi = (MS.pki , BE.pki ). Denote by VMS the set
{MS.pk1 , . . . , MS.pkn }. Denote by VBE the set {BE.pk1 , . . . , BE.pkn }.
The signer randomly picks k ∈R {0, 1}λ and computes (CBE , VBE = BE.Enc(VBE , k).
Next, compute τ = H(pkS , pkV1 , . . . , pkVn , CBE , m). Invoke (σMS , VMS ) ← Sign(MS.skS ,
VMS , m||τ ). Invoke E = SE.Enck (σMS ||τ ||pkS ).
Output the signature as (E, V, CBE ).
• Verify. To verify a signature (E , V , CBE ) on message m, a verifier V parses pkVi as (MS.pki ,
BE.pki ) for all pkVi ∈ V and uses his secret key (MS.skV , BE.skV ) as follows.

– Locate the index i such that pkV = pkVi . Use his secret key to compute k =
BE.Dec(BE.skV , CBE , VBE ), where VBE denotes the set {BE.pk1 , . . . , BE.pkn }.
– Compute σMS , τ , pkS by SE.Deck (E).
– Output invalid if τ ̸= H(pkS , pkV1 , . . . , pkVn , CBE , m).
– Parse pkS as (MS.pkS , BE.pkS ).
– Invoke valid/ invalid ← MS.Verify( MS.pkS , σMS , {MS.pk1 , . . ., MS.pkn },
m||τ , MS.skV ).
Regarding the security of our generic construction, we have the following theorem, whose proof
can be found in Appendix A.
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Theorem 3
Our generic construction satisfies definition d if the underlying MDVS scheme MS satisfies
definitions d for d ∈ {4, 5, 7}. Furthermore, our generic construction satisfies definition 6 if BE
is one-way secure in the random oracle model.
5.3. Concrete Instantiations
Our construction of MDVS in Section 3.4 together with our BE described in this section could
be used together to instantiate a concrete strong MDVS secure against rogue key attack. As a
corollary of theorem 3, this particular instantiation would be secure under the CDH assumption
in the random oracle model. Signature generation involves n + 3 single-base exponentiations and
no pairing while its verification involves 1 signle-base exponentiations, 2 two-base exponentiations,
2 n-base exponentiations and 2 pairings. It is commonly accepted multi-base exponentiations of up
to 3 bases could be computed in time comparable with a single-base exponentiation. Its fair to say
signature verification would take roughly the same time as n + 3 single-base exponentiations plus 2
pairing operations.

6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formalized the security notion unforgeability under rogue key attack for MDVS.
We proposed an efficient construction that is provably secure in the proposed model. In addition,
we present a generic transformation that converts any secure MDVS scheme into a strong MDVS
scheme. We leave the construction of constant size strong MDVS scheme secure under our
definitions as an open problem.
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A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove theorem 1 by the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Unforgeability)
Our construction of MDVS satisfies definition 4 under the discrete logarithm assumption in the
random oracle model.
Proof
We prove by reduction. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that wins in game Unforgeability
with probability ϵ, we show how to construct a simulator S that solves the discrete logarithm
1
problem with probability at least (n−1)ϵ
( (n−1)ϵ
n
nqH − p ), where qHS is the number of hash query made
by A to the random oracle HS and n is the number of designated verifiers.
S is given a problem instance (G, g, p, Z) and its goal is to compute z ∈ Zp such that Z = g z . S
plays the role of the challenger C to the adversary A.
Setup S sets param as (G, g, p), randomly picks an integer n, a value xi ∈R Zp and a hash function
Hi for i = 1 to n. Pick a random index i∗ ∈ [n]. For i ∈ [n] \ {i∗ }, set pkVi as (YVi := g xi , Hi ).
Set pki∗ as (YVi∗ := Z xi∗ , Hi∗ ). Pick a hash function HS and set pkS as (YS := Z, HS ).
Denote by V the set {pkVi }i∈[n] . S gives (param, pkS , V) to A.
Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
• Hash Queries. For all hash queries to HS , S answers with a random value while
maintaining consistency. Note that we only need to assume HS is a random oracle in
this proof.
• Corruption Query. On input a public key pkV ∈ V , locate the index i such that pkV =
pkVi . If i = i∗ , S aborts. Otherwise, S returns xi .
• Signature Query. A submits a message m. S simulates the signature as follows.
∏
1. S computes hi = HVi (pkS , pkV1 , . . . , pkVn , m) and Y = i∈[n] YVhii .
2. S randomly
picks c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 ∈R Zp , assigns the value c1 )+ c2 to the hash
(
( query
of HS YSc1 g z1 , Y c2 g z2 , pkS , pkV1 , h1 , . . .,)pkVn , hn , Y , m . If the tuple YSc1 g z1 ,
Y c2 g z2 , pkS , pkV1 , h1 , . . ., pkVn , hn , Y , m already exists in the set of input query
for HS , S picks another set of (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 ).
3. S returns (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 , V) to A.

Output The probability of not aborting is n−1
and thus the probability that A submits a
n
valid signature is (n−1)ϵ
.
Due
to
the
general
forking lemma[17], S can invoke a forking
n
algorithm associated with A and obtains two valid signatures (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 , V, m) and
1
( (n−1)ϵ
(c′1 , c′2 , z1′ , z2′ , V, m) such that c1 + c2 ̸= c′1 + c′2 with probability at least (n−1)ϵ
n
nqH − p ).
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Solving the Hard Problem Since c1 + c2 ̸= c′1 + c′2 , either c1 ̸= c′1 or c2 ̸= c′2 is true. S solves the
discrete logarithm problem in each case as follows.
c′

′ −z
z1
1
′

′

• c1 ̸= c′1 : By standard argument, YSc1 g z1 = YS 1 g z1 . This implies Z = g c1 −c1 . S returns
z ′ −z
z = c11 −c′1 as the solution to the discrete logarithm problem.
1

′

z ′ −z

′

• c2 ̸= c′2 : Likewise, Y c2 g z2 = Y c2 g z2 . S first compute X = c11 −c′1 such that Y = g X .
1
∑
∏
Since Y = i∈[n] YVhii , X = ( i∈[n]\{i∗ } hi xi ) + zhi∗ xi∗ , where z is the discrete

logarithm of Z to the base g . S returns
logarithm problem.

∑
X−( i∈[n]\{i∗ } hi xi )
(h∗
i xi∗ )

as the solution to the discrete

Lemma 2 (Source Hiding)
Our construction of MDVS satisfies definition 5 unconditionally.
Proof
We describe an algorithm Sim. We follow the view in [11] in which this algorithm should be
distributed such that verifiers do not disclose their secret keys to other verifiers.
Sim. On input the signer’s public key pkS = (YS , HS ), a set of designated verifier’s public key
V = {pkV1 , . . . , pkVn } and a message m, each individual verifier conduct the following:
1. For i = 1 to n, parse the public key pkVi as (YVi , HVi ), compute hi = HVi (pkS , pkV1 , . . .,
∏
pkVn , m) and Y = i∈[n] YVhii .
2. Verifier Vi randomly generates ri , c1,i , z1,i ∈ Zp , computes T2,i = g ri , T1,i = YS c1,i g z1,i and
broadcasts T1,i , T2,i , c1,i , z1,i to all other verifiers.
∏
3. Upon receiving all the T1,i , T2,i for i ∈ [n], all verifiers compute locally T1 = i∈[n] T1,i ,
∏
∑
∑
T2 = i∈[n] T2,i , c1 = i∈[n] c1,i and z1 = i∈[n] z1,i .
4. All verifiers compute locally c = HS (T1 , T2 , pkS , pkV1 , h1 , . . . , pkVn , hn , Y, m) and c2 = c −
c1 .
5. Verifier Vi computes z2,i = ri − c2 hi xVi , where xVi is the secret key of the verifier Vi , and
broadcasts the value z2,i .
6. Upon∑
receiving all the z2,i for i ∈ [n] from other verifiers, all verifiers compute locally
z2 = i∈[n] z2,i
7. All verifiers can output locally the signature as (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 , V).
The distribution of the signature outputted by Sim is identical to that outputted by Sign and thus
source hiding holds unconditionally.
Lemma 3 (Unforgeability Against Rogue Key Attack)
Our construction of MDVS satisfies definition 7 under the DL assumption in the random oracle
model.
Proof
We prove by reduction. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that wins in game Unforgeability
Against Rogue Key Attack with probability ϵ, we show how to construct a simulator S that solves
4
2+q
the discrete logarithm problem with probability at least q2 ϵqH − p1 ( qH qHHV ), where qHS , qHV are
HS

V

S

V

the number of hash queries made by A to the random oracles HS and HV respectively.
S is given a problem instance (G, g, p, Z) and its goal is to compute z ∈ Zp such that Z = g z . S
plays the role of the challenger C to the adversary A.
Setup S sets param as (G, g, p), randomly picks w ∈R Zp and two hash functions HS , HV . Parse
pkS and pkV as (YS := Z, HS ) and (YV := Z w , HV ) respectively. S gives (param, pkS , V) to
A.
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
• Hash Queries. For each hash query to HS or HV , S answers with a new random value
while maintaining consistency.
• Verification Query. Verification in our construction does not require the secret key and
can thus be simulated perfectly.
• Signature Query. A submits a message m and a set of public keys V . S simulates the
signature as follows.
1. Let ℓ = |V|. S parses V as {pk1 := (Y1 , H1 ), . . . , pkℓ := (Yℓ , Hℓ )}.
∏
h
2. S computes hj = Hj (pkS , pk1 , . . . , pkℓ , m) and Y = j∈[ℓ] Yj j .
3. S randomly
picks c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 ∈R Zp , assigns the value
(
) c1 + c2 to (the hash query of
HS YSc1 g z1 , Y c2 g z2 , pkS , pk1 , h1 , . . ., pkℓ , hℓ , Y , m . If the tuple YSc1 g z1 , Y c2 g z2 ,
)
pkS , pk1 , h1 , . . ., pkℓ , hℓ , Y , m already exists in the input query for HS , S picks
another set of (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 ).
4. S returns (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 , V) to A.

Output A submits a valid forgery (σ ∗ , m∗ ) and a set of verifiers V ∗ = {pkV1 , . . ., pkVn∗ }.
Treating HS as a random oracle, S can invoke a forking algorithm associated with A
with respect to random oracle HS and obtains two valid signatures σ1 := (c1 , c2 , z1 , z2 ,
V ∗ , m∗ ) and σ2 := (c′1 , c′2 , z1′ , z2′ , V ∗ , m∗ ) such that c1 + c2 ̸= c′1 + c′2 . Denote the value
∏
HV (pk ,pk ,...,pkVn ,m)
Y = i∈[n∗ ] YVi i S V1
. Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1,
S obtains a value z such that YS = g z or Y = g z . In the former case, S successfully solves
the discrete logarithm problem. Next, show how S solves the discrete logarithm problem in
the latter situation.
The Second Rewind To solve the discrete logarithm in the second case, S makes another rewind
simulation to the point when A issues a HV query for HV (pkS , pk1 , . . ., pkℓ ,m∗ ) associated
with the forged signature. S invokes the forking algorithm associated with A with respect to
random oracle HV to obtain another forged signature σ3 := (c̃1 , c̃2 , z̃1 , z̃2 , V ∗ , m∗ ). After that,
S makes another rewind simulation with respect to random oracle HS again to obtain σ4 :=
(ĉ1 , ĉ2 , ẑ1 , ẑ2 , V ∗ , m∗ ). Since the output of the HV query is an input to the random oracle HS
in the forged signature, A must have made the HV query before marking the query to HS .
Thus, σ3 and σ4 will involve the same set of public keys compared with σ1 and σ2 . Further
more, the value HV (pkS , pk1 , . . . , pkℓ , m∗ ) in (σ1 , σ2 ) (say, hV ) is different to the value
∏
HV (pk ,pk ,...,pkVn ,m)
in the signatures (σ3 , σ4 ) (say, h′V ) . Thus, the value Y ′ = i∈[n∗ ] YVi i S V1
is different to Y . With signatures (σ3 , σ4 ), S can compute the value z ′ such that YS =
′
′
g z or Y ′ = g z . If the former is true, S solves the discrete logarithm problem directly.
′
′
Otherwise, the value (Y /Y ′ ) = g z−z . Recall that YY ′ = Z whV −whV . Thus, S can output
(z − z ′ )(w(hV − h′V ))−1 as the solution to the discrete logarithm problem.
Probability Analysis The probability of A submitting a valid forgery is ϵ. The success probability of
invoking the forking algorithm associated with A, denoted as FA , with respect to the random
oracle HS is at least ϵ′ := ϵ( qHϵ − p1 ) due to the general forking lemma [17]. The success
S
probability of invoking the
forking algorithm associated with FA with respect to random
′
oracle HV is at least ϵ′ ( qHϵ − p1 ), again due to the general forking lemma [22]. The overall
V
success probability of S is thus bounded below by
′

ϵ′ ( qHϵ − p1 ) =
V

=
≥
≥

ϵ′2
ϵ′
qHV − p
ϵ2 (ϵ/qHS −1/p)2
− pϵ ( qHϵ − p1 )
qHV
S
4
ϵ2
ϵ
2ϵ3
−
−
2
qHS qHV p
qHS p
qH qHV
S
2+q
ϵ4
− pqH HqHV
2 q
qH
HV
S
V
S
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A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
We sketch the proof of theorem 2 as follows.
Proof
The proof that our generic construction satisfies definitions 4,5,7 if the underlying MDVS MS
satisfies the corresponding definitions is straightforward. We can easily construct a simulator S that
acts as an attacker against MS if there exists an adversary A against the generic construction. S
receives the system parameters of MS , creates the public and secret keys of a one-way encryption
WE for all users and gives them to A. For any verification query submitted by A, S can use the
secret key of the WE to translate it to an appropriate query to the MS . Finally, when A submits a
forgery, S can decrypts it to produce the forgery of the underlying MS .
We focus on the proof against privacy of signer’s identity. Let A be an adversary with nonnegligible advantage in game PSI. We show how to construct a simulator S that breaks the one-way
security of the encryption WE in the ideal cipher model. The ideal cipher model is equivalent to
the random oracle model [25] and is thus subsumed into the random oracle model in the theorem
statement. S is given an instance of WE = (paramWE , WE.pk) and a challenge ciphertext CWE
and its goal is to output the corresponding plaintext. S creates the parameter of MS honestly and
is in possession of the keys for the two signers and the set of verifiers, say (MS.pki , MS.ski )
for verifier Vi . S invokes WE.mAtk(WE.pk, CWE ) repeatedly to obtain a set of public keys and
∗
ciphertexts (CWE,i
, WE.pki ). Set the public keys of the verifiers as (MS.pki , WE.pki ) for verifier
Vi . S chooses a symmetric cipher SE and a hash function H . SE is modelled as an idealized cipher.
Setup S gives (MS.param, paramWE , SE, H) to A as param, together with the public keys of the
signers and verifiers.
Query S uses the secret key of the signers to answer signature queries. Other types of queries are
discussed below.
• For verification query of signature (E, V, {Ci }i∈[n] ) on message m, S looks through the
encryption query on SE with key k that produces E . If the query is not found, return
invalid. Otherwise, S checks if 1 = WE.iAtk(WE.pki , Ci , k) for all i = 1 to n. If
not, S returns invalid. S obtains (σMS , τ , pkS ) from the encryption query of SE with
output E . S returns invalid if τ ̸= H(pkS , pkV1 , C1 , . . . , pkVn , Cn , m). Otherwise, S
returns the verification results of σMS with secret key MS.ski .
• For each encryption or decryption query submitted by A with key k , S invokes 0/1 ←
WE.iAtk(WE.pk, CWE , k). If the result is 1, S returns k and break the one-way security
of WE .

Challenge At some point A submits a message m∗ . S flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and computes τ =
∗
∗
H(pkSb , pkV1 , CWE,1
, . . . , pkVn , CWE,n
, m). Invoke (σMS , VMS ) ← Sign(MS.skSb , VMS ,
∗
∗
∗
m ||τ ). Pick a random value E . Return (E ∗ , V, {CWE,i
}i∈[n] ) as the challenge signature.
∗
∗
This implicitly sets E = SE.Enck (σMS ||τ ||pkSb ) where k is the value encrypted in CWE,i
for i = 1 to n.
Query Same as the previous query phase.
Output A outputs a guess bit b′ .
It remains to argue A must submit a decryption or encryption query with value k such that
1 = WE.iAtk(WE.pk, CWE , k). Since anything related to the value b is encrypted with a value k
∗
which is encrypted in CWE,i
for i = 1 to n, the only way for A to win is to issue an encryption
or decryption query with k . Thus, the probability that S can break the one-way encryption WE is
equivalent to the advantage of A in game PSI.
c 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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A.3. Proof of Theorem 3
We sketch the proof of theorem 3, which is similar to the proof of theorem 2.
Proof
The proof that our generic construction based on BE satisfies definitions 4,5,7 if the underlying
MDVS MS satisfies the corresponding definitions is straightforward. We can easily construct a
simulator S that acts as an attacker against MS if there exists an adversary A against the generic
construction. S receives the system parameters of MS , creates the public and secret keys of a oneway encryption BE for all users and gives them to A. For any verification query submitted by A, S
can use the secret key of the WE to translate it to an appropriate query to the MS . Finally, when A
submits a forgery, S can decrypts it to produce the forgery of the underlying MS .
We focus on the proof against privacy of signer’s identity. Let A be an adversary with
non-negligible advantage in game PSI. We show how to construct a simulator S that breaks
the one-way security of the encryption BE in the ideal cipher model. S is given an instance
of BE = (paramBE , BE.pk1 , . . . , BE.pkn ) and a challenge ciphertext (CBE , YBE ) where YBE =
{BE.pk1 , . . . , BE.pkn } and its goal is to output the corresponding plaintext. S creates the parameter
of MS honestly and is in possession of the keys for the two signers and the set of verifiers, say
(MS.pki , MS.ski ) for verifier Vi . S sets the public keys of the verifiers as (MS.pki , BE.pki ) for
verifier Vi . S chooses a symmetric cipher SE and a hash function H . SE is modelled as an idealized
cipher.
Setup S gives (MS.param, paramBE , SE, H) to A as param, together with the public keys of the
signers and verifiers.
Query S uses the secret key of the signers to answer signature queries. Other types of queries are
discussed below.
• For verification query of signature (E, V, C) on message m, S looks through the
encryption query on SE with key k that produces E . If the query is not found, return
invalid. Otherwise, S checks if 1 = BE.iAtk(YBE , C, k). If not, S returns invalid.
S obtains (σMS , τ , pkS ) from the encryption query of SE with output E . S returns
invalid if τ ̸= H(pkS , pkV1 , . . . , pkVn , CBE , m). Otherwise, S returns the verification
results of σMS with secret key MS.ski .
• For each encryption or decryption query submitted by A with key k , S invokes 0/1 ←
BE.iAtk(YBE , CWE , k). If the result is 1, S returns k and break the one-way security of
BE .

Challenge At some point A submits a message m∗ . S flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and computes
τ = H(pkSb , pkV1 , . . . , pkVn , CBE , m). Invoke (σMS , VMS ) ← Sign(MS.skSb , VMS , m∗ ||τ ).
Pick a random value E ∗ . Return (E ∗ , V, CBE ) as the challenge signature. This implicitly sets
E ∗ = SE.Enck (σMS ||τ ||pkSb ) where k is the value encrypted in CBE .
Query Same as the previous query phase.
Output A outputs a guess bit b′ .
It remains to argue A must submit a decryption or encryption query with value k such that
1 = BE.iAtk(YBE , CWE , k). Since anything related to the value b is encrypted with a value k which
is encrypted in (CBE , YBE ), the only way for A to win is to issue an encryption or decryption
query with k . Thus, the probability that S can break the one-way encryption BE is equivalent to the
advantage of A in game PSI.
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